*Navigation:* [[Receptor (Process)]] *Project Folder:* Receptor *Resources:* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7Rb56kZQSk | https://bigthink.com/thinking/wittgenstein-duck-rabbit/ | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTgy3WCT0UU | - -- # Wittgenstein — The Philosophy of Language - seven sentences - scepticism from this conception of language - declared sentence - anything that could be said, could be said clearly, or not - mathematics, engineering, practical - numbers his sentences - works logically - limits of our language - limits of social thought - what we can and cannot talk about - The World is All That Is The Case. - What we cannot speak about we must Passover in silence. - there is no absolute chairness - just chair, chair, and our understanding.. - UNREASABLE DEMAND FOR UNREASABLE DEGREE OF CERATINTY - asking the wrong question - just overwriting elements of beauty - no platonic form of beauty - problem is with our overdemanding - danger : therefore, Family Resemblance - shared resemblance between this and this - which we look for when we try to define - depends on what language game you are playing - dont ask for the meaning, ask for the use - It concludes by proposing that aspect perception brings to light the distinction between the world as perceived and the world as objectively construed, and the role we play in the constitution of the former. - # Aspect Perception - two types of seeing - First, we have the standard and **direct act of seeing** — *interpreting the stuff that is broken down into sense data for the eyes* - For example, you can see the light from your phone, the green on a tree, or the roundness of a table. But we also have the ability to **“notice an aspect,”** which is where we see an object _as_ a certain kind of object. - It means to have the same sensation, but to see it in a different way. - To the untrained eye, a blueprint schematic might be mere geometric, maze-like squiggles. But to an engineer, it is “seen as” a blueprint. - The engineer notices an aspect that others do not. - seeing *abacus* - • • • • - They can either be viewed as a whole — four dots in a group — or perhaps they might be seen as two dots in the middle, framed by dots on either side. The image remains the same, but our shift in perception is to “notice an aspect.” - ### **A readymade world** - *“I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an aspect’.”* - *Necker Cube* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necker_cube - ### **Aspect blindness** - This is where a person is incapable of seeing an object a certain way at all. It’s impossible to be _entirely_ aspect blind, because we always have at least one way of seeing that object — even if you that’s just raw visual data. - Some people simply cannot see an actor or a picture as standing for something else. What if you go to watch a play and are utterly unable of seeing that prancing, costumed actor as being Puck, the mischievous fairy? What if you can’t see the old woman in the classic [old-young woman illusion](https://www.illusionsindex.org/i/young-woman-or-old-woman)? What if _(ツ)_ does not appear as an emoji, but only a random, assemblage of nonsense punctuation? - According to Wittgenstein, we should call these people **“aspect blind.”** Be it the distractions of their environment, a lack of prior learning, or simply some unknown psychological factor, but some people simply cannot see one thing as something else. - We are all, if not aspect blind, definitely aspect _ignorant_ to some degree. It might be that objects we assume are one thing actually have a host of hidden aspects waiting to be seen. Maybe tomorrow a toddler will point out your car’s lights look like a face, or [you’ll read an article highlighting hidden images in logos.](https://twentytwowords.com/hidden-images-in-company-logos/) The previous way of seeing things becomes changed. - Transforming seeing the world - Wittgenstein’s examination of the duck-rabbit image reveals to us the power of our learning and induction into our world’s rules. When your teacher says, “this is an abacus” or your parents say, “that’s a rhino”, they are entering your head to irrevocably and magnificently transform how you see the world. - ## https://www.reading.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/sjs/A%20Tale%20of%20Two%20Problems.pdf - https://is.muni.cz/th/b9ffs/DP_Aspektovevidenie.pdf - ![[Screenshot 2023-01-23 at 15.15.42.jpg|300]] - # GAME - dont think, but look - philosophy is battle against bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language - working on one's own interpretation - not gaining facts, gaining perspective - we need new way to looking on language - language-game - philosophers are taking words from everyday life out of context, and therefore killing words - making them meaningless - holding dead symbols - all metaphysical questions are dead language - nonsense - random sounds produces by wind - ### trapped in a picture - held us captive - and we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably - picture of soul in your head - picutre as tools - ### religion - hates teology,, predicting, believing in god,.. people killing language - religion is different than teology - way of living - assessing life - commitment to play language games in certain way - choosing that interpretation over that one - just useful interpretation - clarity > truth - people constantly asking why, are preventent of *seeing* - the mystical is not *how* the world is, but *that* it is - SHUT UP AND LOOK - how hard i find to see what is *right in front of my eyes* - With emotional seeing-as it is obvious that the object of our experience is not really there. What in fact we see is only a portrait of a person or a theatrical representation of certain events, not the person or the events themselves. And yet, at least momentarily it feels as if we were experiencing the real thing. Thus the analogy between emotional seeing-as and the experience of meaning proves useful after all. It might help us to accept that in the latter case, too, we engage imaginatively with something that is not actually present. The sound of a word is associated with its meaning, but the meaning is not really present in the sound of the word, nor in our experience of that sound, even if that is the way it sometimes feels to us.